The Economic Evaluation of Job Safety. A Methodological Survey and some Estimates for Austria by Maier, Gunther et al.
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Gunther Maier and Peter Weiss and Shelby Gerking
The Economic Evaluation of Job Safety. A Methodological Survey and some
Estimates for Austria
Paper
Original Citation:
Maier, Gunther and Weiss, Peter and Gerking, Shelby (1986) The Economic Evaluation of Job
Safety. A Methodological Survey and some Estimates for Austria. IIR-Discussion Papers, 30. WU
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/6230/
Available in ePubWU: April 2018
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Interdisziplinäres Institut für Raumordnung 
Stadt- und Regionalentwicklung 
Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien 
Vorstand: o.Univ.Prof. Dr. Walter B. Stöhr 
A-1090 Wien, Augasse 2-6, Tel. (0222) 34-05-25 
1986 
Peter WEISS, Gunther MAIER, Shelby GERKING 
The Economic Evaluation of Job Safety 
A Methodological Survey and Same Estimates 
for Austria 
I I R - DISCUSSI0N 30 1986 
Peter WEISS, Dept. of Economics, University of Economics, Vienna 
Gunther MAIER, Inst. for Urban & Regional Studies, University of 
Economics, Vienna 
Shelby GERKING, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA 
We are grateful to Dr.Christoph Badelt and the anonymous referees for their 
valuable comments and criticism. 0f course, the authors bear the responsi-
bility for any remaining errors. A revised version of this paper will be 
published in EMPIRICA. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Gesetz 1 iche Rege 1 ungen und direkte staat 1 iche Eingriffe im Be-
reich der Arbeitswelt, des Verkehrs oder der Umwelt haben in 
einem großen Ausmaß die Vermeidung oder Reduzierung von Krank-
heits- und Unfallsrisken zum Ziel. Nicht selten verläuft die 
öffentliche Diskussion über die Beurteilung dieser Maßnahmen im 
außerökonomischen Raum unter (bewußtem oder unbewußtem) Verzicht 
auf die Offenlegung der Kosten-Nutzen-Aspekte. Doch gerade die 
Umweltproblematik demonstriert deutlich die Aktualität der Frage, 
anhand welcher Kriterien die politischen Entscheidungsträger 
derartige Maßnahmen bewerten sollen. 
In dieser Arbeit wird die Frage der Bewertung von Sicherheitsmaß-
nahmen aus der Sicht des Arbeitsmarktes aufgegriffen. Nach einer 
theoretischen Einleitung gibt sie einen überblick über verschie-
dene methodische Konzepte zur Quantifizierung des Nutzens von 
Maßnahmen der Ar bei tsp 1 a tzs icherhe i t. Im empirischen Tei 1 wird 
auf der Basis von Arbeitsmarktdaten aus dem Mikrozensus 1981 und 
nach Wirtschaftszweigen gegliederten Unfallstatistiken öffentli-
cher Versicherungsanstalten die implizite Bewertung des Arbeits-
platzrisikos geschätzt. Hiefür wird die sogenannte "hedonic 
price" - Methode angewandt, d.h. die impliziten Preise von Ar-
beitnehmer- und Arbeitsplatzcharakteristika werden aus beobachte-
ten Daten am Arbeitsmarkt mithilfe von Regressionsschätzungen 
ermittelt. 
Aus den Koeffizienten der Risikovariablen kann über den Betrag 
Auf sch 1 uß gewonnen werden, den die Gese 11 schaft für die Bereit-
ste 11 ung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zur Verminderung des Unfallri-
sikos zu zahlen bereit ist. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, daß 
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auch in Österreich, trotz der in der politischen Diskussion 
dominierenden Auffassung, erhöhtes Arbeitsplatzrisiko sei nicht 
durch monetäre Entschädigungen abzugelten, eine implizite Bezie-
hung zwischen Lohnhöhe und Arbeitsplatzrisiko besteht. Weiters 
zeigt sich, daß eine Bewertung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen anhand 
des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Einkommensentganges aufgrund des Pro-
duktionsausfalles, der durch die Nichtbereitstellung dieser Si-
cherheitsvorkehrungen entstünde, die gesellschaftliche Bewertung 
dieser Maßnahmen schwerwiegend unterschätzt. 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Austria, job safety is controlled by a set of rules and orga-
nizations (work inspectorate, "Arbeitsinspektionsgesetz", "Ar-
beitnehmerschutzgesetz", "Allgemeine Dienstnehmerschutzveror 
dnung", etc. A list of al~ relevant regulations is periodically 
published in "Amtliche Nachrichten des Bundesministeriums fUr 
soziale Verwaltung und des Bundesministeriums für Gesundheit und 
Umweltschutz"). These regulations are the result of political 
decisions and according to the Austrian system of social partner-
ship discussed and previously decided upon by the representatives 
of employers and employees. 
Since there is a trade-off between the amount of money invested 
into job safety and the number of work related accidents and 
deaths, a socially and economically important value judgement is 
inherent in job safety regulations: How much is a reduced number 
of (fatal) accidents worth? Are they worth the costs? Should more 
or fewer resources be devoted to job safety programs in Austria? 
While the cost of job safety programs can be stated in terms of 
money with comparative ease, estimating the social benefits of 
these programs is a more difficult prob lern. lt raises the ques-
tions of what the benefits of job safety are, and how to aggre-
gate the benefits of individual$ up to a measure of social bene-
fits. The direct cost approach tackles this issue by considering 
the increase in value added which is directly attributable to a 
reduction in the number of accidents as a measure of the bene-
fits. However, as discussed more fully in the following section, 
this method neglects the utility workers gain from reductions in 
risk and, therefore, may seriously understate society's wil-
lingness to pay for job safety programs. A more appropriate way 
of estimating the benefits of job safety is to consider the 
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trade-off between wages and risk that has been established by 
agents in the labor market. This trade-off indicates how much 
extra money has tobe paid to attract workers to a more risky 
job, and is referred to as the marginal value of safety. 
This marginal value of safety concept is much broader and applies 
to many more situations than the labor market and job safety. The 
same question, namely how much society is willing to pay for a 
marginal reduction of risk, can be asked in connection with 
policy regulations concerning transportation or the environment. 
Is society willing to accept the costs of speed limits Fora 
reduction of risk due to accidents and pollution? Are people 
willing to pay higher prices of vegetables for more protection by 
stricter regulations concerning the use of pesticides? Will they 
trade less air pollution from power plants for a higher price of 
electricity? The growing interest in environrnental issues during 
recent years dernonstrates at least to some extent an urgent need 
of policy makers for an estirnate of the marginal value of safety. 
However, in many cases this estimation cannot be worked out 
directly, since thete is no market coordinating the valuations of 
the individuals. Thus, estimates derived from the labor market 
may provide guidance also in those cases, where the general 
concept of the marginal value of safety is applicable, but no 
market data are available. 
The so called hedonic price method, which looks at the implicit 
price of risk, will be applied to data for the Austrian labor 
market in section three of this paper. Section two gives abrief 
survey of various methods for the estimation of the benefits of 
job safety regulations or policy actions in general and discusses 
some of the results of similar studies. The concluding section 
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compares these results with the estimates for Austria. 
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2. A SURVEY OF METHODOLOGY 
Two approaches are available for estimating the marginal value of 
safety for Austria: (1) the contingent valuation method and (2) 
the hedonic price method. The contingent valuation method is 
imp 1 emented by taking a survey in which indi v idua 1 respondents 
are directly asked for their marginal value of safety (in AS). 
This magnitude can be solicited in one of two ways. First, the 
respondent could be asked for his willingness to pay for a small 
reduction in job related risks of fatal accidents. Second, he 
could be asked to state the extra compensation required to induce 
him to willingly accept an otherwise identical job with slightly 
greater risk of fatal accidents. As demonstrated in Gegax, Ger-
king, and Sch~lze (1985), the latter of these two approaches may 
lead to an upward biased estimate of the marginal value of safe-
ty; a result that is consistent with other contingent valuation 
studies of environmenta 1 hazards (see Cummings, Brookshine, and 
Schul:_~, 1986). At this time, however, no contingent valuation 
survey has been undertaken in Austria. The hedonic price method 
is used exclusively in this study. Additionally, the hedonic 
price method general ly is regarded as the more accurate of the 
two methods by those making environmental benefit assessments. 
The hedonic price method, as applied to estimating the marginal 
value of safety from labor market data, usually is implemented by 
estimating the wage determination model shown in equation (1). 
WAGE = f (H ,P ,W ,RISK ) (1) 
i i i i i 
where WAGEi denotes the wage paid to the i-th worker, Hi denotes 
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a vector of human capital variables, Pi denotes a vector of 
personal characteristics, Wi denotes a vector of work environment 
variables, and RISKi denotes a measure of the probability of a 
fatal accident while at work. Under the assumption of perfectly 
competitive markets and perfect labor mobility, this equation is 
interpreted as a reduced form market clearing hedonic wage equa-
tion. This relation is the double envelope of workers indiffer-
ence curves and firms iso-profit curves (Rosen 1974 and Smith 
1979). As a consequence, the s lope of the curve in the wage risk 
plane, awAGE/clRISK, is equal to the workers marginal rate of 
substitution between wages and risks of fatal accidents. This 
partial derivative is expected tobe positive and its magnitude 
reflects the market determined compensation that a worker would 
receive for accepting a small increase in risk of death on the 
job. Thus, it is used as the basis for estimating the marginal 
val ue of safety. 
The hedonic wage approach (and the contingent valuation method 
for that matter) to estimating the marginal value of safety 
represents a departure from the so-called human capital approach. 
That latter method values reductions in safety according to the 
discounted present value of lost earnings due to increased 
deaths. The advantage of the human capital approach is its actua-
rial focus; however, this method contains an implicit and ques-
tionable judgement that safety can be valued in terms of gains 
and lasses in value added. In other words, this method would 
assign a zero marginal value of safety to a retiree from the 
labor force, even though retirees certainly would pay a positive 
sum in order to reduce the risk of death they face. The hedonic 
wage approach, on the other hand, contains no such judgement. 
Instead, this method focuses on bargains made between empl oyers 
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and emp 1 oyees throughout the economy and a 11 ows f or the d irect 
disutility workers may experience as risk of death on the job 
rises. As a consequence, the estimate of a WAGE/3 RISK derived from 
equation (1) can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to 
pay to avoid risk. Of course, extrapolation outside the sample 
always is dangerous; nevertheless, this marginal willingness to 
pay figure can be applied to risks faced by labor force retirees 
with greater confidence than can the zero value obtained from the 
human capital method. 
Despite its superior conceptual properties, the hedonic wage 
approach, when applied to data from the United States and the 
United Kingdom, has yielded vastly different estimates of the 
marginal value of safety. For example, the pioneering study by 
Thaler and Rosen (1975) found a value of approximately $200,000 
(in 1967 dollars) while other studies have estimated the marginal 
value of safety tobe more than $3,000,000 (in 1977 dollars) 
(Olson 1981). This range of estimates, together with their poten-
tial significance in formulating public policy, has triggered a 
lively debate over which estimates are best supported and how the 
differences between them can be explained. Marin and Psacharopou-
los (1982) have compared the results of previous hedonic wage and 
risk studies and found two factors which simultaneously bear on 
both of these issues. 
First, some studies, including those by Brown (1980), Thaler and 
Rosen (1975) and Arnould and Nichols (1983) have used data 
measuring total excess death rates classified by occupation (i.e. 
total death rates less those expected on the basis of the workers 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics) ; while other 
investigators such as Viscusi (1979) and Olson (1981) have used 
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data on fatal accidents at work classified by industry. Estimates 
of willingness to pay to avoid risk are consistently five toten 
times larger in studies that use industry as compared with 
occupational risk data. According to Marin and Psacharopoulos, 
this situation suggests the possibility that in risky industries, 
the entire wage structure may be affected so that workers on 
relatively safe jobs may earn more than they would if employed in 
another industry. Therefore, the use of industry risk data may 
result in an overestimate of the marginal value of safty. Another 
possibility is that the use of data measuring total excess death 
rates may result in an underestirnate of the marginal value of 
safety because many causes of death (cancers, for exarnple) are 
difficult to relate to specific work environrnent characteristics 
and their risks may not be fully perceived. Gegax, Gerking and 
Schulze (1985) discuss this issue of perception in greater de-
tail. Moreover, mernbers of certain occupations may be subject to 
disproportionately greater risks of death from non-work related 
causes. Therefore, studies which make use of accidental death, 
rather than total excess death rate data may be on the most solid 
ground. 
Second, nearly all of the empirical hedonic wage-risk studies 
carried out to date have used highly restricted non-random samp-
les. Thaler and Rosen, for example, considered only workers in 
the most dangerous occupations and Viscusi's results are based on 
a sample of blue col lar workers. The effect of this factor on the 
marginal value of safety estimates is difficult to assess. 
At first, it would appear that hedonic wage estimates of the 
marginal value of safety would be superior if they were based on 
as broad a sample as possible. A large national random sarnple 
migh t be regarded as idea 1. Appearances, however, can be decei-
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ving because some types of workers may face little or no risk of 
a fatal accident on the job. For these workers risk would not 
enter the production function for their job, implying that no 
hedonic wage-risk gradient exists. As a consequence, it actually 
may be more des irab 1 e to focus the ana 1 ysis on a subset of wor-
kers who are known to face some positive and perceptible risk 
levels. The empirical work reported in the following section, 
therefore, focuses on Austrian blue collar workers. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR AUSTRIA 
In Austria, maintenance of job safety is mainly a task of the 
work inspectorate. Unlike the situation in the 0.S., for example, 
there exists only a weak economic incentive towards job safety. 
Since compensation payments for injuries on the job are usually 
covered by social insurance, the financial risk due to work 
related accidents is rather lirnited for the employer (see Koziol, 
1984). Moreover, the amount of compensation is restricted to 
direct costs. Thus, the employee (or his farnily) is entitled only 
to compensation for medical care, rehabilitation or funeral cost. 
As far as the relation between risk and wages is concerned, the 
consequences may be twofold: 
If the organizations in charge of the control of risk on the 
job are able to reduce risk on al 1 jobs to the same level, the 
interindustry differences in risk will vanish as well as any 
risk-premium included in the wage. 
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If they are unable to do so, workers facing extra risk on 
their job may receive higher wage-differentials than workers 
in a country with regulations allowing for more extensive 
compensation. Workers demand higher extra wages to substitute 
for the lower compensation they will receive (or their fami-
lies in the case of a fatal accident), and employers can 
afford it since lower compensation payments yield higher ex-
pected prof its. 
As can be conjectured (and will be shown later in the paper), the 
differences in risk cannot be eliminated completely. Thus, we 
expect the implicit price of risk as it is established in the 
Austrian labor market tobe rather high compared to other count-
ries. One reason lies in the low compensation payments, which can 
be obtained for job related accidents in Austria. 2 
The empirical analysis applies the hedonic wage equation, which 
was sketched in (1). It uses a data set drawn from the 1981 
Microcensus file of the Austrian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(öStZ). Risk measures are derived from hitherto unpublished fi-
gures on total and fatal accidents on the job by industry from 
three public insurance companies. 
The 1981 Microcensus is a supplementary survey to the 1981 Popu-
lation Census and comprises about 70.000 individuals. For the 
present analysis only a small subset of about 4200 individuals is 
used. One of the selection criteria is the availability of infor-
mation on al 1 relevant characteristics. A further reduction of 
the data set results from the exclusion of white collar workers, 
civil servants, and workers in agriculture. The exclusion of 
white collar workers and civil servants is justified by the fact 
that no hedonic gradient for these workers may exist. Agricultu-
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ral workers can be regarded as outliers in the sample since the 
earnings level is one of the lowest, possibly because of non-
monetary income components, whereas the risk of accidents is the 
highest at all. Thus, this group was excluded on empirical 
grounds. 
The dependent variable used in the regression analysis is (the 
logarithm of} the average monthly net earnings. Explanatory va-
riables which control for differences in worker and workplace 
characteristics are a vector of dummies indicating highest 
educational attainment, hours actually worked per week, a proxy 
for work experience, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
person is female and a dummy variable indicating whether the 
person is skilled for the workplace presently held. 
Risk measures were derived from social insurance data. Two compa-
nies ("Allgemeine Unfallversicherungs Anstalt", "Versicherungsan-
stalt der österreichischen Eisenbahnen") made information on the 
total number of insured employees, number of job related acci-
dents, and number of fatal accidents by 26 industries available 
to us for the years 1977 to 1984. Unfortunately, there are no 
appropriate data by occupatio~. From the "Versicherungsanstalt 
öffentlich Bediensteter" only the number of job related accidents 
was available by industry. The other two figures could be re-
ceived in sum only. They had tobe ascribed to industries by 
their shares of accidents. However, this company insures less 
than ten percent of Austrian workers. 
To reduce the stochastic element in our risk measures, the ave-
rage numbers over the eight year period 1977-84 rather than 
figures for a single year were used. It can be seen from the 
results presented in table 1 that there is a marked difference of 
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risk across industries. Workers in construction or mining are 
about 40 times more threatened to die on the job than workers in 
the clothing industry. Almost fifteen out of one-hundred con-
struction workers are injured by job related accidents every 
year. This figure is nearly twenty times higher than the corres-
ponding one in banking. 
From the two indicators presented in table 1, fatal accidents per 
1000 workers is the preferable one for measuring work related 
risk. lt is based on the clearly Observable event, whether or not 
a person was killed in a job related accident. The figures on 
accidents per 1000 workers, on the other hand, result from the 
aggregation of various types of injuries. However, to obtain 
results comparable to a direct cost study for Austria, worked out 
on the basis of the total number of work related accidents, 
(Kunz, 1984, Kunz, without year) the empirical analysis was 
carried out with the second risk indicator as well. 
A problem when using regression methods to estimate equation (1) 
is the choice of the functional form since on theoretical grounds 
there is no clearly superior solution. However, experiments with 
a Box-Cox-transformation by Gegax, Gerking and Schulze (1985) 
show that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of 
functional form. For this reason and its slightly superior theo-
retical justification the familiar semilog-linear form is chosen. 
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Table 1: Number of Accidents per 1000 Workers in Austrianlndu-
str ies per Year (Average and Standard Deviation of Per iod 
1977-1984)*) 
Agriculture, Forestry (1) 
Electricty, Gas, Water (4) 
Mining, Quarrying (2) 
Manufacturing of Food, Beverages, 
Tabacco (31) 
Manufacturing of Textiles (321) 
Manufacturing of Weaving Apparel, 
Footwear (322, 324) 
Manufacturing of Leather (323) 
Manufacturing of Wood (33) 
Manufacturing of Paper (341) 
Printing, Publishing (342) 
Manufacturing of Chemicals (35) 
Manufacturing of Non-Metal Minerals (36) 
Basic Metal Industry and Manufacturing 
of Fabricated Metal Products (37,38) 
Construction (5) 
Trade, Storage (61,62) 
Hotels, Restaurants (63) 
Transport, Communication (7) 
Financing, Insurance (81,82) 
Business Services (83) 
Sanitary Services (92) 
Cultural Services (94) 
Health Services, Welfare Insti-
tutions (933, 934) 
Educational Services, Research 
Institutes (931,932) 
Public Administration (91, 935) 
Household Services (953) 
Total 
95.57 
( 5 .0 0) 
54,23 
(2.56) 
81.41 
( 3. 4 9) 
75.54 
(3.59) 
40.73 
( 2. 12) 
23.88 
( 1. 84) 
35.81 
(3.97) 
99.09 
( 2. 4 7) 
101.32 
( 6. 5 8) 
38.66 
( 2. 3 8) 
69.04 
( 3. 3 8) 
107.98 
( 5. 19) 
110.68 
(6.46) 
149.09 
( 2. 6 8) 
3 2 .8 6 
( 1. 23) 
37.35 
( 2. 08) 
46.13 
( 1. 77) 
8.022 
( 0. 31) 
15.83 
( 1. 58) 
32.81 
(2.71) 
35.36 
(2.47) 
47.92 
(1. 77) 
22.67 
( 1. 66) 
19.04 
( 0. 4 2) 
14.81 
(0.51) 
Fatal 
0.517 
(0.122) 
0.157 
(0.070) 
0.367 
(0.114) 
0.087 
(0.020) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
0.099 
(0.104) 
0.105 
(0.034) 
0.083 
(0.049) 
0.040 
(0.030) 
0.076 
(0.129) 
0.154 
(0.055) 
0.071 
(0.014) 
0.358 
(0.043) 
0.056 
(0.012) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
0.208 
(0.038) 
0.037 
( 0. 027) 
0.055 
(0.024) 
0.058 
(0.025) 
0.074 
(0.065) 
0.027 
(0.010) 
0.039 
(0.021) 
0.056 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.18)) 
*) Number after the industry descriptor represents the ISIC-Code. 
Source: Data kindly made available by "Allgemeine Unfallversi-
cherungsansta 1 t", "Vers icherungsansta 1 t der österreichischen Ei-
senbahnen" and "Versicherungsanstalt öffentlicher Bediensteter" 
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Another problern is the stochastic nature of our risk variable. It 
is well known that the pararneter of a variable which is measured 
with error is biased toward zero when estimated by OLS. The bias 
is related to the variances of the unrneasured true variable and 
the error cornponent. By using the pooled variance of the time 
variances of risk by industries (see table 1) as an estirnator of 
the variance of the rneasurernent error, rnaxirnurn likelihood estirna-
tors can be derived (see Dhrymes 1978, p. 242 ss). Actual ly, for 
the empirical analysis presented below the rnaximum likelihood 
estimates were calculated as well. But since the differences in 
results turned out tobe of minor importance, only the OLS-
estirnates are reported. 
Basically two specifications of the reduced form hedonic wage 
equation can be found in the literature. They differ in the way 
the risk variable enters the equation and usually yield markedly 
different results. The first is a semilog-linear function with 
the risk variable entering linearly. The second adds a quadratic 
term of the risk measure, allowing for increasing or dirninishing 
returns on safety. 
The results of our regression analysis when using fatal accidents 
per 1000 workers as risk measure are summarized in table 2. All 
coefficients have the sign usually expected in human capital 
. 3 
related analys1. s. In particular, the coefficients of the risk 
variables are al 1 significantly different frorn zero. Using the 
second specification, both, the risk and the risk-square coeffi-
cient prove to be highly significant, indicating that the rela-
tionship between wages and risk is nonlinear. Moreover, the 
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Table 2: Regression Results of Equation (1) Using Fatal Accidents 
as Measure of Risk (t-va 1 ues in parenthesis) 
( 1) ( 2) 
INTERCEPT 7.137 6.994 
(15.82) (15.50) 
SEX -1.521 -1.385 
(-3.29) (-3.00) 
SCHOOLl .0469 .0477 
3. 7 6) 3. 8 3) 
SCHOOL2 .1375 .1393 
( 3.66) ( 3.72) 
SCHOOL2 * SEX -.1250 -.123 
(-2.28) (-2.25) 
EXPER .0214 .0212 
(10.43) (10.38) 
EXPER * SEX -.00922 -.0094 
(-2.80) (-2.87) 
EXPER2 -.00038 -.00038 
(-8.64) (-8.56) 
EXPER2 * SEX .00016 .00017 
2.32) 2.37) 
WTIME .4084 .4293 
3.35) 3. 5 2) 
WTIME * SEX .3427 .3197 
2.75) 2. 5 7) 
SKILL .0970 .0983 
7.71) ( 7 . 8 3 ) 
RISK .2282 1.2894 
5.28) ( 5.78) 
RISK * SEX .4518 
2. 9 9) 
RISK2 -2.4906 
(-4.67) 
R**2 .5 2 . 5 2 
N 4225 4225 
Notes: SEX = 1 for female, 0 formale. SCHOOLl is a dummy 
variable assuming a value of 1 when the respondent had a degree 
from an occupational training school (Lehrabschlußprüfung). 
SCHOOL2 assumes a value of 1, whenever the respondent had a 
higher educational level than compulsory secondary general 
school. EXPER is a proxy for work experience and was computed as 
age minus years of schooling minus 6. EXPER2 is the squared 
EXPER-variable. WTIME is the log of the respondents weekly 
working time. SKILL is a dummy indicating whether the respondent 
was skilled for the work place he occupied at the time of the 
survey. Interaction variables for schooling, experience, working 
time and risk with sex were used to allow for the differential 
effect of these factors on men and women. 
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negative coefficient of the risk-sguare variable implies a much 
lower marginal value of safety for risky industries than for less 
risky ones. This suggests that the labor market can be viewed as 
providing a selection mechanism which sorts individuals with high 
risk aversion to the safer industries and vice versa (see Thaler 
and Rosen 1975, Olson 1981, Sider 1985). 
It could be suspected that our estimated equation lacks variables 
concerning workplace productivity and general working conditions. 
We tried two productivity measures, namely capital coefficient 
and capital intensity, but both turned out tobe insignificant. 
Omitting factors of working conditions is even more dangerous as 
there might exist some positive corre 1 ation between accidenta 1 
risk and bad working conditions. 0nder these circumstances our 
estimates of the risk coefficient would be biased upward. 
However, in a study done by Christl (1985) for Austria it is 
found that most of the variables measuring working conditions 
have an insignif icant effect on wages and some of them even the 
wrong sign. Nevertheless, our risk coefficient might reflect the 
some influence of general working conditions as well4 • But this 
is true for most of the other studies with which we compare our 
estimates. 
The regression results can be used to compute the implicit price 
of safety. By virtue of our semilog-linear specification the 
coefficient of the risk variable, say b, represents the partial 
derivative of the logarithm of the monthly income, log Y, with 
respect to the risk variable, RISK. Treating the other variables 
as paramters we can write: 
dlogY 
b := ------ = 
dRISK 
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1 
y 
dY 
dRISK 
whereby f o l 1 OWS: 
dY = Y.b.dRISK 
Multiplying through with the number of workers N and taking into 
account that we have defined the risk variable as the number of 
accidents, ACC, per 1000 workers per year (RISK = 1000.ACC/N) it 
follows: 
dY.N = Y.b.dRISK.N = Y.b.1000.dACC ( 2) 
A similar equation can be derived for the nonlinear specifi-
cation: 
dY.N = Y.(b1 + 2b 2.RISK).1000.dACC ( 3) / 
the only difference occuring from the somewhat more complicated 
derivative of income with respect to risk. Since dY is the 
differential in monthly income a worker is prepared to accept in 
exchange of a reduction in the number of accidents by 1, the 
expression on the left hand side represents the total sum of 
benefits accruing to society (measured in income per month) when 
the number of accidents per year is reduced by 1. 
These figures can be calculated from the right-hand sides of (2) 
and (3). In order to make our figures comparable to those of 
other studies we converted them to a yearly basis by inserting 
income per year rather than per month, i.e. we multiplied the 
income figures by 14. For the linear specification the average 
income in the sample of 101.000 AS per year (7.215 * 14) was 
inserted and yielded a result of 33 million AS. For the quadratic 
specification the corresponding figure is usual ly cornputed by 
inserting average incorne and average risk into equation /3) (see 
for example Qlson, 1981). This is quite unsatisfactory, since 
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even when taking the geometric mean of income we are off the 
regression function at this point due to the inclusion of the 
quadratic risk term. A more appropriate way is to apply the 
sample enumeration method, i.e. to evaluate equation (3) for 
every individual in the sample and take the average therefrom. 
Using this procedure we arrive at an arnount of 55 mil lion AS 5 . 
Similar to the results of other studies this is considerably 
higher than the figure from the linear function. The reason lies 
in the skewed distribution of risk in the sample. More than 70 % 
of the workers face a risk of fatal accident below the mean. 
Thus, the majority of workers place a higher value on safety than 
the average worker. As a consequence the linear specification 
which implicitly assumes the same marginal value of safety 
throughout the sarnple underestimates the average value. 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Equation (1) Using Total Accidents 
as Measure of Risk (t-values in parenthesis) 
INTERCEPT 
SEX 
SCHOOLl 
SCHOOL2 
SCHOOL2 * SEX 
EXPER 
EXPER * SEX 
EXPER2 
EXPER2 * SEX 
WTIME 
WTIME * SEX 
SKILL 
RISK 
RISK2 
R**2 
N 
Notes: See table 2 
( 1) 
6.905 
(15.82) 
-1.239 
(-2.67) 
.0475 
3. 8 2) 
.1381 
( 3.72) 
-.1321 
(-2.41) 
.0217 
(10.66) 
-.00997 
(-3.03) 
-.00038 
(-8.81) 
.00018 
2.56) 
.4549 
3. 7 3) 
.2787 
2.23) 
.0905 
7.21) 
.00097 
8.19) 
.5 2 
4225 
( 2) 
6.861 
(15.19) 
-1.198 
(-2.59) 
.0477 
3. 8 3) 
.1395 
( 3. 7 3) 
-.1306 
(-2.39) 
.0219 
(10.72) 
-.0105 
(-3.20) 
-.00038 
(-8.84) 
.00019 
2.70) 
.4547 
3. 7 3) 
.2699 
2.16) 
.0911 
7. 2 6) 
.0023 
( 4. 8 3) 
-.000008 
(-2.92) 
• 5 2 
4225 
Using total accidents per 1000 workers as risk measure the margi-
nal value of safety can be interpreted as the amount of money 
society is willing to pay for the prevention of one average work-
accident. Again the regression results yield statistically signi-
ficant risk coefficients 6 (see table 3). This yields a marginal 
value of safety of about 95.000 AS for the first specification 
7 
and 89.000 AS for the second. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To summarize our results the Austrian situation is characterized 
by 2 facts: 
Despite an elaborated set of safety regulations there remains 
a substantial heterogeneity of work places with regard to the 
risk of accident. Using data of accidents per worker across 
different industries it is found that the probability of a 
fatal accident is more than fourty times higher in "high risk" 
industries compared with "low risk" industries. 
Although the political discussion concerning job safety is 
dominated by the value judgement that a human life cannot be 
evaluated in terms of money such an evaluation is implicit to 
the Austrian labor market. Applying the hedonic price method 
we could find fairly reasonable values for the implicit price 
of job-safety. The significant negative quadratic risk term 
shows that the labor market allocates less risk averse indivi-
duals into riskier industries. 
That latter result has the somewhat surprising policy irnplication 
that a reduction of risk in a low-risk industry has a more bene-
ficial effect than in a high-risk industry. This follows from the 
fact that the relative increase in wages becomes smaller as the 
probability of risk grows. 
When cornpared to the results of the other studies (see section 2) 
our estimate of 55 mill. AS for the marginal value of safety 
turns out tobe one of the highest. This is partly due to the use 
of risk data classified by industry. Nevertheless, it supports 
our hypothesis that the regulations concerning compensation pay-
ments in Austria wil 1 bring forward a higher implicit price of 
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risk in the labour market. 
Finally, we want to compare our figures with the results of a 
study for Austria undertaken by the "Allgemeine Unfallversiche-
rungsanstalt" {see Kunz, 1984; Kunz, without year). By applying 
the direct cost approach, which corresponds roughly to the summa-
tion of the costs necessary to eure the injured person and the 
forgone value added of the firm due to lost working days, this 
study arrives at figures of 25.000 to 40.000 AS per accident for 
the whole economy in 1982 and of 14.000 to 20.000 per accident 
counting only costs occurring to the firm. As can be seen, our 
estimates are about three times higher when using total accidents 
as risk measure which seems tobe roughly comparable with the 
accident data used by Kunz. This indicates that for Austria, too, 
the direct cost approach seriously underestimates the social 
costs of accidents by neglecting the willingness-to-pay of indi-
viduals for a reduced risk. Kunz arrives at the conclusion that 
the benefits of preventing an accident (measured in direct costs 
of accidents) are nearly twice as high as the respective costs. 
Since the benefit measures derived from our analysis are much 
higher than those of Kunz, we can even enforce his conclusion 
that at present job safety regulations seem tobe too weak in 
Austria. 
The model applied in the paper implicitly assumes a neoclassical 
labor market with the usual restrictive assumptions like 
atomistic market structures, fu 11 inf ormation, perf ect mobi 1 i ty 
and optimizing behaviour. We are fully aware of the fact that 
1 abor markets are not tha t s imp 1 e. They are segmen ted and there 
is an unequal distribution of bargaining power between employers 
and employees, especially in a period of economic recession where 
our data are from. Consequently we do not intend to plea for a 
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substitution of Austrian job safety regulations by a 'free mar-
ket', but for economic incentives supporting job safety regula-
tions. However, as f ar as the margina 1 va 1 ue of safety measure is 
concerned, the market imperfections mentioned above tend to lower 
the risk premium payed to workers. Thus, the 55 mill. AS resul-
ting from the estimation might even underestimate the true margi-
8 
nal value of safety. 
As mentioned in section 1 the marginal value of safety concept 
applies to many more situations than the labor market, in parti-
cular to situations where there is no market at all. If the 
results from the labor market apply generally, an environmental 
policy, for example, which tries to equate the cost of safety 
measures with the expected cost prevented, will underestimate the 
benefits to the Austrian society. It will bring about much to 
weak regu lations and earn broad dissent in the popu lation. 
Willingness-to-pay measures might be a better guideline for 
environmental policy than aggregated direct cost even when they 
are derived from the labor market. 
NOTES 
1) An interesting alternative to assesing the relationship bet-
ween risk and wages from individual survey data discussed in 
the following is to use aggregate time series data and esti-
mate a production model with risk as a separate input factor. 
This procedure is not covered in the survey below (see e.g. 
Sider 1985) 
2) Since some studies indicate that unionized workers receive a 
higher risk-premium (Thaler and Rosen, 1975, Olson, 1981) 
alternatively it couldbeargued that the higherdegree of 
unionization in Austria leads to a hisher overall value of the 
implicit price of risk. Generally speaking the estimates de-
pend on the legal and institutional organisation of the labor 
market in a country, since they are derived from a double 
envelope of worker indifference curves and firm iso-profit 
curves. 
3) The specification displayed in table 2 is condensed from a 
more general one containing a more detailed set of educational 
dummy variables and allowing for parameter differences between 
men and warnen for all variables. However, the estimates for 
al 1 educational levels above medium level secondary school 
turned out tobe statistically identical with that of SCHOOL2. 
So we can aggregate them up to just one category. Elimination 
of insignificant interactions between SEX and other variables 
yields the specification reported in table 2. 
4) The existence of various kinds of bonus paymants cornpensating 
for bad working conditions does not necessarily mean that 
wages are higher for those jobs. It is perfectly conceivable 
that the wage leve 1 for those jobs is so much lower that bonus 
payrnents only bring it up to the general wage level. At least 
this interpretation is compatible with the results of Christl 
(1985). 
5) Estimation at the average yields a value of nearly 66 mill AS. 
At leastin our data set application of thissimplemethod in-
troduces a considerable bias in the marginal value of safety. 
6) This contrasts with the results of Christl (1985). In this 
study a compensating differences model is estimated and one of 
the variables included is a measure of oerceived risk at work. 
This variable turns out tobe significant only for women. 
7) Note that in this case the nonlinear specification yields a 
lower figure than the linear. This results from a left-skewed 
distribution of total accidents per 1000 workers. 
8) Of course, there is no need to interprete our empirical re-
sults in this restricted sense. Alternatively, one could de-
rive the estimated wage-risk-relationship from a bargaining 
type model with unions and industry representatives negotia-
ting the wage structure. As an anonymous referee pointed out, 
if worker representatives are better informed about risks than 
workers the observed wage-risk-relationship could be even more 
close to the equilibrium position. This could be another 
reason for the high estimate of the marginal value of safety 
for Austria. 
REFERENCES 
Arnould, R.J. and L.M. Nichols, "Wage-Risk Premiums and Workers 
Compensation: A Refinement of Estimates of Compensating Wage 
Differentials", Journal of Political Economy, 91 {April, 
1983), pp. 332-340. 
Brown, C., "Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market", Quarter-
ly Journal of Economics, 94 {February, 1980), pp. 113-134. 
Christl, J., "Verdienstdifferentiale zwischen Männern und Frauen: 
Theorie und empirische Ergebnisse für Österreich", IHS-For-
schungsbericht No. 224, Vienna 1985 
Cummings, R., D. Brookshire, and W. Schulze, "Valuing Public 
Goods", Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1986, 
forthcoming. 
Dhrymes, Ph.J., "Introductory Econometrics", New York Heide 1 berg 
Berlin, Springer, 1978. 
Gegax, D., S. Gerking and W. Schulze, "Perceived Risk and the 
Marginal Value of Safety", manuscript, University of Wyoming, 
August, 1985. 
Koziol, H., "österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht", Vol. II, 2nd 
Ed., Vienna, Manz, 1984. 
Kunz, W., "Arbeitsunfälle infolge fehlender persönlicher Schutz-
ausrüstung; Unfallanalyse - Kostenanalyse Wirtschaftlichkeits-
aspekte", Typoskripte, Allgemeine Unfallversicherungsanstalt, 
Vienna, without year. 
Kunz, W., "Betriebliche Arbeitsunfallfolgekosten", Typoskripte, 
Allgemeine Unfallversicherungsanstalt, Vienna, 1984. 
Marin, A. and G. Psacharopoulos, "The Reward for Risk in the 
Labor Market: Evidence from the United Kingdom and a Reconci-
liation with other Studies", Journal of Political Economy, 90 
{August, 1982), pp. 827-853. 
Olson, C.A., "An Analysis of Wage Differentials Received by 
Workers on Dangerous Jobs", Journal of Human Resources, 16 
(1981), pp. 167-185. 
Rosen, S., "Hedonic Pr ices and Imp 1 ic i t Markets: Product Dif f er-
entiation in Pure Competition", Journal of Political Economy, 
82 (January/February, 1974), pp. 34-55. 
Sider, H., "Werk Related Accidents and the Production Process", 
Journal of Human Resources, 20 (1985), pp. 47-63. 
Smi th, R.S., "Compensating Wage Dif f erentia 1 s and Pub 1 ic Po 1 icy: 
A Review", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 32 {April, 
1979), pp. 339-352. 
Tha 1 er, R. and S. Rosen, "The Va 1 ue of Lif e Sa v ing", in Nestor E. 
Terleckyj (ed.), Household Production and Consumption, (New 
York: Columbia University Press for NEER), 1975. 
Viscusi, W.K., Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market 
Performance, Cambridge: Harvard Oniversity Press, 1979. 
